

Draft Syllabus
AREC 869: Political Economy of Development

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UMD AREC

Term: *Spring 2026*

Credits: up to 9

Course Times: TuTh 11 AM – 12 15 PM

A Introduction

This course will serve as an introduction to several key topics in political economy, as seen from the lens of empirical development economics. We will survey a broad cross-section of papers that provide graduate students with a sense of how the newly emergent field of political economy of development (PED) has evolved over the past three decades. The idea is to provide graduate students with the knowledge of the research frontier, directions for new research and equip them with an understanding of empirical tools commonly used in the literature. Students will be exposed to recent advances in empirical methods seen in political economy, including practical applications of field experiments and natural experiments.

This course is divided into two broad themes: institutional actors and institutional and social features. Under the former, we will engage with scholarship on politicians and bureaucrats, focusing on empirical research related to their selection and incentives. Under the latter, we will study topics such as corruption, collective action, clientelism, ethnic differences, affirmative action and historical persistence. Every week, there will be mandatory starred readings related to the topic and, should the student wish to acquaint themselves with certain topics in greater detail, a longer list of additional readings.

While this course is squarely focused on empirical papers, there will be some brief stylized forays into theory, both in political economy and econometrics. The reading list is indicative of this.

Learning Outcomes

After successfully completing this course you will:

- Have command over the new literature in empirical political economy of development and identify gaps in the literature.
- Develop a clear understanding of how casual inference techniques are applied.
- Be able to critically analyze papers in the field.

Course Structure and Assessment

Course grades will be based on the following

- 2 Paragraph Response Notes: 20%
 - 8 throughout the term
 - Lowest dropped
- Replicate + Re-evaluation exercise: 10%
- Referee Report: 10%
- Final Exam: 30%
- Class Presentation: 20%
- Class Participation: 10%

There will be no final exam for this course.

UMD Policies and Resources for Graduate Courses

Please visit <https://gradschool.umd.edu/course-related-policies> for The Graduate School's full list of campus-wide policies and follow up with me if you have questions.

Academic Integrity

The University's Code of Academic Integrity is designed to ensure that the principles of academic honesty and integrity are upheld. In accordance with this code, the University of Maryland does not tolerate academic dishonesty. Please ensure that you fully understand this code and its implications because all acts of academic dishonesty will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this code. All students are expected to adhere to this Code. It is your responsibility to read it and know what it says, so you can start your professional life on the right path. **As future professionals, your commitment to high ethical standards and honesty begins with your time at the University of Maryland.**

It is important to note that course assistance websites, such as CourseHero, are not permitted sources, unless the instructor explicitly gives permission for you to use one of these sites. Material taken or copied from these sites can be deemed unauthorized material and a violation of academic integrity. These sites offer information that might not be accurate and that shortcut the learning process, particularly the critical thinking steps necessary for college-level assignments.

Additionally, it is understandable that students may use a variety of online or virtual forums for course-wide discussion (e.g., GroupME or WeChat). Collaboration in this way regarding concepts discussed in this course is permissible. However, collaboration on graded assignments is strictly prohibited unless otherwise stated. Examples of prohibited collaboration include asking classmates for answers on quizzes or exams, asking for access codes to clicker polls, etc.

Resources & Accommodations

Extensions and Support

2020-21 was a difficult year worldwide and we are likely to be dealing with its fallout for some time to come. If there is anything we can do, within or outside the confines of the course, to be supportive,

please do reach out. Within the confines of the course, the deadlines are primarily to help structure your workflow and not intended to be restrictive; extensions are possible. Outside the confines, we know how difficult graduate education can be in the best of times, so we are here to offer support or advice in navigating the experience as best we can.

Accessibility and Disability Services

The University of Maryland is committed to creating and maintaining a welcoming and inclusive educational, working, and living environment for people of all abilities. The University of Maryland is also committed to the principle that no qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the University, or be subjected to discrimination. The [Accessibility & Disability Service \(ADS\)](#) provides reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals to provide equal access to services, programs and activities. ADS cannot assist retroactively, so it is generally best to request accommodations several weeks before the semester begins or as soon as a disability becomes known. Any student who needs accommodations should contact me as soon as possible so that I have sufficient time to make arrangements.

For assistance in obtaining an accommodation, contact Accessibility and Disability Service at 301-314-7682, or email them at adsfrontdesk@umd.edu. Information about [sharing your accommodations with instructors](#), [note taking assistance](#) and more is available from the [Counseling Center](#).

Student Resources and Services

For academic support, a broad set of resources is listed on the [UMD's Student Academic Support Services website](#). For pure coursework concerns, [UMD's Writing Center](#) can provide a fresh look at a draft.

For other types of support, the resources listed on [UMD's Student Resources and Services website](#) may help. If you feel it would be helpful to have someone to talk to, visit [UMD's Counseling Center](#) or [one of the many other mental health resources on campus](#).

Basic Needs Security

If you have difficulty affording groceries or accessing sufficient food to eat every day, or lack a safe and stable place to live, please visit [UMD's Division of Student Affairs website](#) for information about resources the campus offers you and let me know if I can help in any way.

Course Evaluation

Please submit a course evaluation through CourseEvalUM in order to help faculty and administrators improve teaching and learning at Maryland. All information submitted to CourseEvalUM is confidential. Campus will notify you when CourseEvalUM is open for you to complete your evaluations for fall semester courses. Please go directly to the [Course Eval UM website](#) to complete your evaluations. By completing all of your evaluations each semester, you will have the privilege of accessing through Testudo, the evaluation reports for the thousands of courses for which 70% or more students submitted their evaluations.

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B Assignment Details

Readings

I expect students to have read the starred reading for the class before arriving to class. The very short response papers are structured to be commitment devices, so that students are incentivized to read and respond to at least one reading for the week.

In my slides and the lecture, I will focus on aspects of the paper relevant to the broader topic of the day, but I expect students' prior reading of the paper to help fill in the gaps and add to class discussion. The better read you are, the higher the quality of discussion you will be able to participate in.

Very Short Response Notes

I expect students to write a minimum of **8 very short response notes** to a starred reading from the week. The notes should have the following structure:

- **Paper summary** (1 paragraph)
 - **One interesting feature of the paper** (1 paragraph)
- OR**
- **One thing you would change about the paper** (1 paragraph)

The idea with the response note is for you to have read (and lightly engaged with) the paper.

From time to time, I may ask you to briefly explain or expand on what you wrote in your response note. These questions will not test whether you are “right,” but whether you have actually read and thought about the paper and your own reaction to it.

Please do not use AI tools to write these response notes. These notes are meant to help you practice reading academic work, identifying arguments, and forming your own reactions. Using AI to generate a response defeats the purpose of the exercise and will make it much harder to participate meaningfully in class discussion. Reading the paper yourself—even imperfectly—is far more valuable for your learning than producing a polished summary.

I expect the response notes no later than 11 AM on the morning of class. Notes submitted late shall be docked points.

Class Presentation

Every student should, over the course of the semester, present any of 2 unstarred papers.

During the presentation, students are expected to assume the role of the author of the paper. The presentation should be no longer than 10 minutes. The presentation structure will mimic a typical econ seminar talk. This will roughly have the following structure:

- Motivation slide(s): 1-2 slides
- Main Questions: 1 slide
- Context: 1 slide
- Preview of Results: 5 slides
 - This should include empirical methodology

The idea here is for graduate students to familiarize themselves with the style and format common in the discipline. You will be presenting a lot over the next few years (and many more, if you chose to stay in academia). This will provide a flavour of how that experience may pan out.

Replication and Re-evaluation Exercise

You will be given a few papers that you will be encouraged to replicate and re-evaluate. Of course, the replication materials will be available from the journal website (which will be available to the student on the course website too). However, the expectation here is for you to replicate the work considering recent empirical advances in methods: you will subject the paper to more modern scrutiny than was possible when the paper was written. Remember, one of the features of the modern empirical revolution in economics is how recently it happened and how much is *still changing*.

While re-evaluating the paper, I would like you to focus on the following questions:

- Does the paper replicate when newer methods are employed?
 - What does and does not replicate?
 - Do you still believe in the core findings of the paper?
- Normatively, in light of the advances in the literature since the paper was published, what other questions should the writers have thought of?

This will be due in the week before Spring Break.

Referee Report

The assignment for the class will be a full-fledged referee report of a paper of your choice that relates to political economy. I will have a few job market candidates' papers on the course website that you can go over and review. Over the course of the semester, I will use the lens of a referee report to structure some of my comments on the papers we discuss. I am hoping you will pick up on that and rely on your own weekly Very Short Response Notes as starting points to write your report. I will provide a structure for the report – a typical report has a summary of the paper, followed by major and minor comments – and it is up to you to build on that. This will be due in the last week of class.

Final Exam

There will be one in-class final exam for the course. The exam will test your understanding of the core literature covered in the course as well as your familiarity with the common empirical methods used in these readings.

The exam will be held on the last Thursday before the reading period begins.

C Readings

The foundational theories underpinning most of the empirical work in political economics are found in the two sources below:

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G., 2002. *Political economics: explaining economic policy*. MIT press.

C.1 Politicians

Week 1: Political Selection

*Gulzar, S., & Khan, MY. (2021). “Good Politicians”: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance. *Review of Economic Studies*, forthcoming.

*Avis, E., Ferraz, C., Finan, F. and Varjão, C., 2022. Money and politics: The effects of campaign spending limits on political entry and competition. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 14(4), pp.167-199.

Marx, B., Pons, V. and Rollet, V. (2025) ‘Electoral Turnovers’, *Review of Economic Studies*, 92(5), pp. 3306–3339.

Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2005). Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), 835–864. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098757>

Cruz, C., Labonne, J., & Querubín, P. (2017). Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines. *The American Economic Review*, 107(10), 3006–3037. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44871776>

George, S. (2022). Like Father, Like Son: The Economic Effects of Political Dynasties.

Labonne, J., Parsa, S., & Querubín, P. (2021). Political Dynasties, Term Limits and Female Political Empowerment: Evidence from the Philippines. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*.

Sen, I. and Sharan, M.R., 2025. The Impact of Women’s Self Help Groups on Electoral Participation: Evidence from India.

Banerjee, A. V., & Pande, R. (2007). Parochial politics: Ethnic preferences and politician corruption.

Dal Bó, E. and Finan, F., 2018. Progress and perspectives in the study of political selection. *Annual Review of Economics*, 10, pp.541-575.

Besley, T., Pande, R. and Rao, V., 2012. Just rewards? Local politics and public resource allocation in South India. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 26(2), pp.191-216.

Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T. and Rickne, J., 2017. Who becomes a politician?. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4), pp.1877-1914.¹

Week 2: Politician Incentives

*Bó, E. D., & Rossi, M. A. (2011). Term Length and the Effort of Politicians. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4), 1237–1263. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41407060>

* Dal Bó, Ernesto, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan & Pedro Pessoa (2024). *When Democracy Refuses to Die: Evaluating a Training Program for New Politicians*. NBER Working Paper No. 33251. National Bureau of Economic Research

Fisman, R., Schulz, F., & Vig, V. (2014). The Private Returns to Public Office. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(4), 806–862. <https://doi.org/10.1086/676334>

Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 2011. Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance.

Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R. and Walton, M., 2024. Public information is an incentive for politicians: Experimental evidence from Delhi elections. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 16(3), pp.323-353.

C.2 Bureaucrats

Week 3: Bureaucrat Selection

*Bó, E. D., Finan, F., & Rossi, M. A. (2013). Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call To Public Service. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(3), 1169–1218. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26372521>

*Weaver, Jeffrey. 2021. "Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring." *American Economic Review*, 111 (10): 3093-3122.

Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott S. Lee. 2020. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services." *American Economic Review*, 110 (5): 1355-94.

Deserranno, Erika. 2019. "Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11 (1): 277-317.

¹ Strictly speaking, not a PED paper, since it is set in Sweden.

Hanna, Rema, and Shing-Yi Wang. 2017. "Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 9 (3): 262-90.

Mangal, K., 2021. How Much is a Government Job in India Worth?.

Besley, T., Burgess, R., Khan, A. and Xu, G., 2022. Bureaucracy and development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 14, pp.397-424.

Week 4: Bureaucrat Incentives

* Khan, M.Y., 2025. Mission motivation and public sector performance: experimental evidence from Pakistan. *American Economic Review*, 115(7), pp.2343-2375.

*Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla, Guo Xu, The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance, *The Review of Economic Studies*, Volume 87, Issue 2, March 2020, Pages 626–655, <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz029>

Rasul, I., & Rogger, D. (2018). Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service. *The Economic Journal*, 128(608), 413–446. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eoj.12418>

Xu, Guo. "The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire." *The American Economic Review* 108, no. 11 (2018): 3170–98. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26528325>.

Dasgupta, A. and Kapur, D., 2020. The political economy of bureaucratic overload: Evidence from rural development officials in India. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4), pp.1316-1334.

Bhavnani, R.R. and Lee, A., 2018. Local embeddedness and bureaucratic performance: evidence from India. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1), pp.71-87.

Banerjee, A., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Keniston, D. and Singh, N., 2021. Improving police performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental evidence on incentives, managerial autonomy, and training. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13(1), pp.36-66.

(Theory) Banerjee, A.V., Chassang, S., Montero, S. and Snowberg, E., 2020. A theory of experimenters: Robustness, randomization, and balance. *American Economic Review*, 110(4), pp.1206-30.

Week 5: Monitoring Bureaucrats

*Dhaliwal, I., & Hanna, R. (2017). The devil is in the details: The successes and limitations of bureaucratic reform in India. *Journal of Development Economics*, 124, 1-21.

*Mattsson, M., 2025. Information systems, service delivery, and corruption: Evidence from the bangladesh civil service. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 17(3), pp.414-445.

Bandiera, O., Best, M.C., Khan, A.Q. and Prat, A., 2021. The allocation of authority in organizations: A field experiment with bureaucrats. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4), pp.2195-2242.

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P. and Sukhtankar, S., 2023. Identity verification standards in welfare programs: Experimental evidence from India. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, pp.1-46.

Barnwal, P. (2021). Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India's Direct Benefit Transfer Policy, *Revise & Resubmit, American Economic Review*.

(Theory) Banerjee, A., Mullainathan, S. and Hanna, R., 2012. *Corruption* (No. w17968). National Bureau of economic research.

C.3 Institutional & Social Features

Week 6: Political Parties/Taxation

Parties

* Casey, K., Kamara, A.B. and Meriggi, N.F., 2021. An experiment in candidate selection. *American Economic Review*, 111(5), pp.1575-1612.

*Bidwell, K., Casey, K. and Glennerster, R., 2020. Debates: Voting and expenditure responses to political communication. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(8), pp.2880-2924.

Wantchekon, L., 2003. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World politics*, 55(3), pp.399-422.

Taxation

*Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja, Benjamin A. Olken, Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume 131, Issue 1, February 2016, Pages 219–271, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv042>

*Balan, P., Bergeron, A., Tourek, G. and Weigel, J.L., 2022. Local elites as state capacity: How city chiefs use local information to increase tax compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *American Economic Review*, 112(3), pp.762-797.

Gadenne, L., 2017. Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, pp.274-314.

Khan, A.Q., Khwaja, A.I. and Olken, B.A., 2019. Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings. *American Economic Review*, 109(1), pp.237-270.

Week 7: Corruption (Measurement & Consequences)

*Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 2008. Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 123(2), pp.703-745.

*Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(2), 200–249. <https://doi.org/10.1086/517935>

Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. *The American Economic Review*, 101(4), 1274–1311.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23045899>

Mahadevan, M. (2021). The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity.

Theory: Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1993. Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3), pp.599-617.

Week 8: SPRING BREAK

Week 9: Corruption (Technology)

*Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Imbert, C., Mathew, S. and Pande, R., 2020. E-governance, accountability, and leakage in public programs: Experimental evidence from a financial management reform in India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 12(4), pp.39-72.

*Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S. (2016). Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India. *The American Economic Review*, 106(10), 2895–2929.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43956939>

Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2009). The Experimental Approach to Development Economics. *Annual Review of Economics*, 1, 151–178. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42940160>

Jeong, D., Shenoy, A. and Zimmermann, L., 2023. Is Corruption Compensation? Evidence from Local Public Office in India. *Forthcoming: Journal of Public Economics*.

Dreze, J. (2022). On the perils of Embedded Experiments. *Forthcoming*. Download here: <https://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/miscellany/on-the-perils-of-embedded-experiments.html>

Week 12: Collective Action and Protest

*Banerjee, A.V., Banerji, R., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R. and Khemani, S., 2010. Pitfalls of participatory programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(1), pp.1-30.

*Björkman, M. and Svensson, J., 2009. Power to the people: evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2), pp.735-769.

Björkman, M., & Svensson, J. (2010). When is community-based monitoring effective? Evidence from a randomized experiment in primary health in Uganda. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8(2-3), 571-581.

Banerjee, A., Iyer, L., & Somanathan, R. (2007). Public action for public goods. *Handbook of development economics*, 4, 3117-3154.

Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2019). Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2), 1021-1077.

Bursztyn, L., Cantoni, D., Yang, D.Y., Yuchtman, N. and Zhang, Y.J., 2021. Persistent political engagement: Social interactions and the dynamics of protest movements. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3(2), pp.233-50.

Bhavnani, R. R., & Jha, S. (2014). Gandhi's gift: Lessons for peaceful reform from india's struggle for democracy. *Forthcoming, Economics of Peace and Security Journal, revised from Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper*, 2143.

Khwaja, A. I. (2009). Can good projects succeed in bad communities?. *Journal of public Economics*, 93(7-8), 899-916.

Björkman Nyqvist, M., De Walque, D. and Svensson, J., 2017. Experimental evidence on the long-run impact of community-based monitoring. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(1), pp.33-69.

Week 10: Clientelism

*Finan, F., & Schechter, L. (2012). VOTE-BUYING AND RECIPROCITY. *Econometrica*, 80(2), 863–881.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41493836>

*Anderson, S., Francois, P., & Kotwal, A. (2015). Clientelism in Indian Villages. *The American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780–1816. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43495439>

Fujiwara, Thomas, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5 (4): 241-55.

Cruz, C., Keefer, P. and Labonne, J., 2021. Buying informed voters: New effects of information on voters and candidates. *The Economic Journal*, 131(635), pp.1105-1134.

Robinson, J.A. and Verdier, T., 2013. The political economy of clientelism. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 115(2), pp.260-291.

Banerjee, A. V., & Pande, R. (2007). Parochial politics: Ethnic preferences and politician corruption.

Week 11: Local Governance

*Martinez-Bravo, Monica. 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia." *American Economic Review*, 104 (4): 1244-87.

*Narasimhan, V. and Weaver, J., 2022. *Polity size and local government performance: evidence from India*. Working Paper.

Martinez-Bravo, M., Mukherjee, P. and Stegmann, A., 2017. The non-democratic roots of elite capture: Evidence from Soeharto mayors in Indonesia. *Econometrica*, 85(6), pp.1991-2010.

Martinez-Bravo, M., Padró I Miquel, G., Qian, N. and Yao, Y., 2022. The rise and fall of local elections in China. *American Economic Review*, 112(9), pp.2921-2958.

Hessami, Z., 2018. Accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 100(1), pp.51-64.

(Theory) Bardhan, P.K. and Mookherjee, D., 2000. Capture and governance at local and national levels. *American economic review*, 90(2), pp.135-139.

Week 13: Affirmative Action Policies

*Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004). Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5), 1409–1443. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>

*Sharan, M R., & Kumar, C. (2022). The Distributional Consequences of Affirmative Action Policies

Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., & Topalova, P. (2009). Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1497–1540. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40506265>

Pande, R., 2003. Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India. *American economic review*, 93(4), pp.1132-1151.

Week 14: Historical Persistence

*Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.

*Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India. *American Economic Review*, 95(4), 1190-1213.

Dell, M. (2010). The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.

Nunn, N., 2008. The long-term effects of Africa's slave trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), pp.139-176.

Nunn, N. and Wantchekon, L., 2011. The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa. *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp.3221-52.

Albouy, D.Y., 2012. The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation: comment. *American economic review*, 102(6), pp.3059-76.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., 2012. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Reply. *American Economic Review*, 102(6), pp.3077-3110.

Iversen, V., Palmer-Jones, R. and Sen, K., 2013. On the colonial origins of agricultural development in

India: a re-examination of Banerjee and Iyer, 'History, institutions and economic performance'. *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(12), pp.1631-1646.

Banerjee, A. and Iyer, L., 2013. Response to 'A re-examination of Banerjee and Iyer' by Iversen, Palmer-Jones and Sen. *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(12), pp.1647-1650.

Week 15: Additional Topics/Student Presentations